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COMMENT
A RE-EXAMINATION OF IN PARI DELICTO UNDER THE
ANTITRUST LAWS
The private antitrust action' has long been considered the cor-
nerstone of antitrust enforcement. Congress, the courts, and commentators
have frequently recognized the vita] role this suit plays in promoting com-
petition.' Designed to obviate the need for a vastly expanded federal en-
forcement agency, 3 the private action, which provides plaintiffs with treble
damages, supplements the deterrent effect of government actions thereby
encouraging compliance with the antitrust laws. 4 Moreover, because private
litigants are less hesitant than governmental authorities to bring suit against
local or short-lived conduct or against behavior falling short of flagrant vio-
lation, private actions often reveal violations that otherwise would go un-
discovered. 5
Since such a high premium is placed on private antitrust suits, few af-
. firmative defenses are allowed. One frequently invoked defense adopted
from the common law is in pari delicto 6 , which allows a defendant to defeat
a plaintiff's action for relief by proof that the plaintiff himself was a party
or an accomplice to the complained of illegal combination or conspiracy.'
' 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) provides that:
fainy person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any-
thing forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the
United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an
agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover three-fold
the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attor-
ney's fee.
2 See, e.g., Lawlor v, National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 329 (1955); Olympic
Ref. Co. v. Carter, 332 F.2d 260, 264 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 900 (1964); Loevinger,
Private Action—the Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 ANTrrausT BULL. 167, 168 (1958); Comment,
Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties: Analysis of Developments in the Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE
L.J. 1010 (1952); 110 CONG. REC. 3139-41 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
Although commentators have disagreed on the question of whether the antitrust laws
should be concerned with objectives other than the promotion of efficiency, compare Bork,
Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & EcoN. 7 (1966) with Elzinga, The Goals
of Antitrust: Other Than Competition and Efficiency, What Else Counts?, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 19
(1977), the Supreme Court has recently indicated that antitrust analysis, at least under the
Sherman Act, should be restricted to economics. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2549 (1977).
"See Loevinger, Private Action—the Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 ANTITRUST BuLt,. 167.
168 (1958).
` See C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 257 (1959).
2 1d.
"In pari delicto literally means "of equal fault." Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. In-
ternational Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 135 (1968).
Besides in pari delicto, other important affirmative defenses in antitrust litigation are
the statute of limitations and "passing on." The statutes of limitations defense bars any action
initiated four years after the complained-of conduct. 15 U.S.C. 15(b) (1970). More difficult
to establish than the statute of limitations defense, the "passing on" defense requires the de-
fendint to show not only that the plaintiff increased his price in response to and in the
amount of the defendant's overcharge, but also that plaintiffs margin of profit and total sales
did not decline. See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
Related to the in pari delicto defense, although factually different, is the defense of' un-
clean hands. In contrast to in pari delicto, which results only where the parties participated in
the same illegal act, unclean hands bars recovery when a plaintiff has violated the antitrust
laws in a matter unrelated to the defendant's conduct. Courts, however, occasionally have used
the terms interchangeably. Compare Moore v. Mead Serv. Co., 184 F.2d 338, 340 (10th Cir.
207
BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
Underlying this defense are both the judicial policy against unjust enrich-
ment8
 and the principle that a plaintiff "has no right to complain of the ef-
fect of the actions of which he had a part in bringing about."
For the past twenty-five years, however, courts have been reluctant to
allow the defense to prevail, since its application substantially dilutes the
antitrust laws' function of discouraging anticompetitive conduct.'° The Su-
preme Court's 1968 decision in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts
Corp." was the culmination of this judicial hostility to in pari delicto. In
Perma Life the Court purported to abolish the in pari delicto defense in
federal antitrust actions." Yet, the decision failed to indicate clearly
whether in pari delicto was to be inapplicable in all cases. Indeed, the opin-
ion of the Court expressly left open the possibility that antitrust plaintiffs
might be barred from recovery where their conduct demonstrated "com-
plete involvement and participation" in the challenged anticompetitive
scheme.' 3
Since Perma Life, lower courts have continued to grapple with the in
pari delicto defense. Although some courts have suggested that Perma Life
completely abolished the in pari delicto defense," most have held that
some form of a fault defense still exists.' 5 Among those courts permitting
the defense, varying degrees of plaintiff participation have been used to
define in pari delicto. While these various approaches appear straightfor-
ward, they are potentially difficult to apply and they lack uniformity. Most
importantly, they fail to honor fully the purpose of the antitrust laws—
maximizing consumer satisfaction by promoting competition. Thus, since
courts follow no consistent approach in applying the defense, in pari de-
licto remains today what one commentator termed it twenty years ago—
"the unknown quantity in private antitrust suits.""
This comment will first chart the history of the in pari delicto defense
under the antitrust laws prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Perma
Life. The Perma Life decision and the various approaches to the application
of the defense it has engendered then will be analyzed. Finally, it will be
submitted that the in pari delicto defense should be abolished except in
very rare circumstances, since any more permissive approach effectively
lessens competition—a result antithetical to the purpose of 'the antitrust
laws.
1950) (using in pari delicto to mean unclean hands), with International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v.
General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 296 F.Supp. 920, 927 (D.Hawaii 1969) (using unclean hands to
mean in pari delicto).
See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 154 (1968)
(Harlan, J., dissenting in part).
9
 Davidson v. Kansas City Star Co., 202 F.Supp. 613, 616 (W.D. Mo. 1962).
'°Cf. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph F. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951)
(abolishing the unclean hands defense in antitrust actions). See text at notes 26.48 infra for a
discussion of hostility to the in pari delicto defense prior to the Supreme Court's opinion in
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
" 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
"Id. at 140.
13 Id.
"See text at notes 82-88 infra.
"See text at notes 89-115 infra.
1 ° Bushby, The Unknown Quantity in Private Antitrust Suits—The Defense of In Pari Delicto,
42 VA. L. REV. 785 (1955).
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I. THE RISE AND FALL — AND RESURRECTION — OF IN PARI DELICTO
A. Lower Court Law
At common law the doctrine of in pari delicto denied relief to a plain-
tiff who "voluntarily acceded to, fostered and profited" from the practice
of which he complained.'T Although the Sherman Act and its legislative
history provided no basis for the availability of the defense in antritrust ac-
tions," the federal courts generally embraced the defense" following its in-
itial appearance in a 1900 district court case. 2" Providing the rationale for
" J.0. VON KALINOWSEI, ION BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: Antitrust Laws and Trade Re-
gulations § 109.02 (1977 ed.). See Williams v, Hedley, 8 East 378, 381-82, 103 Eng. Rep. 388,
389 (1807). Common law courts found in pari delicto a flexible concept. Some jurisdictions in-
terpreted the doctrine to mean only that one who participated in an illegal actifity could not
recover from his fellow wrongdoers for injuries resulting from their joint endeavor. See Hall
v. Corcoran, 107 Mass. 251, 259-60 (1871). Other courts applied the defense more broadly to
bar recovery on a showing dial the plaintiff was guilty of unlawful conduct that was merely
connected to his loss. Whelden v. Chappel, 8 R.I. 230, 233 (1865).
" At the same time that the ultimately-enacted Sherman bill was pending in Congress,
two bills had been introduced which authorized as a defense the plaintiff's violation of the
antitrust laws in contract actions for the purchase price of goods sold. S. Doc, No. 147, 57th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1903). Also under congressional consideration were proposals which would
have stripped federal courts of jurisdiction to enforce rights arising out of transactions in vio-
lation of the antitrust act. Id. See Comment, Limiting the Unclean Hands and In Pari Delicto De-
fenses in Antitrust Suits.' An Additional Justification, 54 Nw, V.I. REV. 456, 456 n.2 (1959). In ad-
dition, some state antitrust statutes in operation at the time the Sherman Act was enacted
allowed a defense based on the plaintiff's own violations of state antitrust laws. See, e.g., I LI,.
ANN. STAT. ch . 121 3/2, § 306 (Smith-Hurd 1959) (repealed 1965). Bushby, The Unknown Quan-
tity in Private Antitrust Suits–the Defense of In Pari Delicto, 42 VA. L. REV. 785, 787 (1955). From
congressional rejection of all the above approaches, a rejection of in pari delicto might, be in.
(erred. Rendering this interpretation less dispositive, however, is the fact that when section 7
of the Sherman Act was recast as section 4 of the Clayton Act the in pari delicto defense had
been recognized in the courts for 14 years. That no statutory amendment was made could in-
dicate a congressional ratification of the defense or a legislative belief that the defense was
available notwithstanding any express statutory grant. Id. at 788. In sum, the legislative history
provides no definitive answer to the question whether the defense is to be considered in pri-
vate antitrust suits.
"See, e.g., Bishop v. American Preservers Co., 105 Fed. 845 (N.D. 111. 1900); Bluefields
S.S. Co. v. United Fruit Co., 243 Fed. l (3d Cir. 1917); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Blackmore, 277
Fed. 694 (2d Cir. 1921); Tilden v. Quaker Oats Co., I F.2d 160 (7th Cir. 1924); Murny v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 40 F. Supp. 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1940); Mid-West Theatres Co. v. Co-
Operative Theatres of Michigan, Inc., 43 F.Supp. 216 (E.D. Mich. 1941); Northwestern Oil
Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1943) (dictum), cert. denied, 321 U.S.
792 (1944); Allgair v. Glenmore Distilleries Co., 91 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Pennsylvania
Water & Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas Elec. Light & Power Co., 209 F.2d 131 (4th Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 960 (1954); Singer v. A. Hollander & Son, Inc., 202 F.2d 55 (3d
Cir. 1953); National Transformer Corp. v. France Mfg. Co., 215 F.2d 343 (fith Cir. 1954); Al-.
filiated Music Enterprises, Inc. v. Sesac, Inc., 17 F.R.D. 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Louisiana
Petroleum Retail Dealers, Inc. v. Texas Co., 148 F. Supp. 334 (W.D. La. 1956); H. & A,
Selmer, Inc. v. Musical Instrument Exch. Inc., 154 F. Supp. 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
" Bishop v. American Preservers Co., 105 Fed. 845 (N.D. 111. 1900). In Bishop, the
plaintiff entered into an agreement conveying , his preserve manufacturing business to the de-
fendant as part of a trust formed in an attempt "to purchase and control the entire manufac-
ture of preserves in the United States." After the conveyance, Bishop continued to operate the
business in his own name. A disagreement arose, however, and the defendant took possession
of plaintiff's plant by replevin. Thereupon, plaintiff's antitrust counter-suit was dismissed, in
part because "plaintiff was himself a party to the illegal combination." Id. at 846.
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these courts' solicitude toward the doctrine was the believed inequity which
would result in permitting a wrongdoer to recover treble damages for il-
legal behavior in which he participated or where his damages stemmed
from his own involvement in the unlawful scheme." Judicial animus to the
defense's anticompetitive effect, however, steadily mounted following this-
early acceptance. 22
 Prior to the Supreme Court's half-hearted abolition of
in pari delicto in Perma Life, the federal courts were attempting to delineate
the permissible parameters of the defense.
In many cases the public policy favoring private suits was not deemed
sufficiently substantial to bar recognition of the in pari delicto defense. Ac-
cordingly, the doctrine was widely accepted where the plaintiff was a co-
initiator of an illegal scheme. 23 Whatever damage that befell the plaintiff in
such instances was considered to spring directly from his own actions."
Similarly, involvement in an illegal scheme, even though falling short of
co-initiation, could be fatal to the plaintiff's suit if he participated without
having been coerced in the same illegal act of which he complained." In
sum, courts initially applied the in pari delicto defense where the plaintiff
dealt with the defendant on illegal terms, even where otherwise the plain-
tiff might have been foreclosed from dealing with the defendant
altogether.
However, where the plaintiff showed that his participation in an anti-
trust violation was dictated by forces of economic coercion, or where a
plaintiff prior to initiation of suit had renounced his wrongful participation
in an antitrust offense, the judicial concern for the equity between the par-
ties, the rationale underlying the defense, engendered exceptions to the
doctrine. Hence, if a plaintiff's only source of supply was through an illegal
contract with the defendant," or if failure to deal with the defendant
would cause the plaintiff to lose his investment in a going enterprise," the
"See Comment, In Pari Deli(*) and Consent as Defenses in Private Antitrust Suits, 78 HARV,
L. REV. 1241, 1242 (1965).
" See text at notes 26-32 infra.
" In one case of this type, two utility companies entered into an illegal agreement in re-
straint of trade under which each agreed not to construct new facilities without the other's
consent. When the plaintiff sought to build additional facilities, the defendant refused to grant
its permission, and ultimately the plaintiff was required to go to court to have the contract de-
clared illegal and unenforceable. Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas Elec. &
Power Co., 186 F.2d 934, 937 (4th Cir. 1951). The plaintiff then sued for treble damages
based upon lost profits and the increased construction costs caused by the delay. Noting the
plaintiff's part in the formation of the agreement, the court denied relief on the basis of in
pari delicto. 209 F.2d 131, 134 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 960 (1954). See also Gaines
V. Carrollton Tobacco Bd. of Trade, 386 F.2d 757, 759 (6th Cir. 1967).
24 Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas Elec. Light & Power Co., 209
F.2d 131, 135 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 960 (1954).
" See, e.g., Crest Auto Supplies, Inc. v. Ero Mfg. Co., 360 F.2d 896, 899-901 (7th Cir.
1966); Bales v. Kansas City Star Co., 336 F.2d 439, 444 (8th Cir. 1964); Kershaw v. Kershaw
Mfg. Co., 209 F. Supp. 447, 454 (M.D. Ala. 1962), affd, 327 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1964);
Lehmann Trading Corp. v. J. & H. Stolow Inc., 184 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
"See, e.g., Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar, 334 U.S. 219, 242-43
(1948); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 377 (1927); Peter
v. Western Newspaper Union, 200 F.2d 867, 870 (5th Cir. 1953); Banana Distrib., Inc., v.
United Fruit Co., 162 F. Supp. 32, 37 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
" See Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d 647, 652-53 (2d Cir. 1945).
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plaintiff's participation in an antitrust violation would be excused for pur-
poses of allowing suit against the coercing defendant. Similarly, courts gen-
erally permitted a plaintiff to sue his co-conspirators and recover damages
for injury incurred after his withdrawal from the challenged antitrust con-
spiracy. In the leading case of Victor Talking Machine Co. v. Kemeny," the
plaintiff, a licensed retail dealer of Victor talking machines and accessories,
violated the resale price maintenance terms of his contract with the.manu-
facturer. When Victor terminated the dealership, the plaintiff successfully
brought suit on the basis of the defendant's having induced other dis-
tributors and dealers to refrain from filling plaintiffs orders for Victor
products. 29
 Viewing the plaintiff more as victim than as participant in an
antitrust violation, the Third Circuit approved lower court jury instructions
stipulating that "it [made] very little difference what may have transpired
before" the termination of the contract. 30
Significantly, the judicial decision not to invoke in pari delicto in each
of these sets of circumstances suffered from the absence of a clearly ex-
pressed rationale. Although reference was occasionally made to the "over-
riding statutory policy of the Sherman Act," 3 ' the purpose of the excep-
tions developed in the lower courts seemed more attributable to a judicial
desire to temper the otherwise harsh result of barring a less culpable in-
jured plaintiff from any form of civil compensation. 32
B. Fault Defenses From Kiefer-Stewart
to Perma Life
The Supreme Court subsequently rendered academic this lower court
deficiency of rationale in creating exceptions to the in pari delicto defense.
In two important antitrust decisions, the Court introduced an approach to
f'ault defenses in antitrust actions which held as its central focus the effec-
tuation of the antitrust laws' function in promoting competition. However,
neither of these decisions directly addressed the general applicability of the
in pari delicto defense.
In the first of these cases, Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram and
Sons, Inc., 33 the Court completely abolished the "unclean hands" defense in
antitrust damage actions. 34 Kiefer-Stewart had sought treble damages alleg-
ing that the Seagrams and Calvert corporations had conspired to sell liquor
only to Indiana wholesalers who agreed to resell at prices fixed by the two
distilleries. Seagrams and Calvert defended by producing evidence de-
' S 27 1 Fed. 810 (3d Cir. 1921).
23 1d. at 218. See also Connecticut Importing Co. v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 101 F.2d
79, 81 (2d Cir. 1939).
3° Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. Kemeny, 271 Fed. 810, 818 (3d Cir. 1921).
3 ' Johnson v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 33 F. Stipp. 176, 179 (E.D. Tenn. 1940) affd,
123 F.2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1941). See also Connecticut Importing Co. v. Frankfort Distilleries, I01
F.2d 79, 81 (2d Cir. 1939).
32 See Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d 647, 655 (2d Cir. 1945).
" 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
34 Id. at 214-15. For the distinction between in pari delicto and unclean hands, see note
7, supra.
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signed to show that Kiefer-Stewart itself had agreed with other Indiana
wholesalers to set their own liquor prices. 35 The Court, however, ruled that
a plaintiff in an antitrust suit could not be barred from recovering damages
by proof that he had engaged in a conspiracy to commit some unrelated
antitrust violation. 36
 If the allegations of plaintiff's illegal conduct were
meritorious, the Court suggested, the plaintiff could be held responsible in
appropriate proceedings brought against them by the government or by in-
jured third parties." Although unexpressed in Kiefer-Stewart, the Court ap-
parently recognized that, absent future suit by a government or some in-
jured third party, if a defendant's unclean hands defense were accepted,
both parties would be free to continue their illegal activities, much to the
detriment of the public interest. 39
 Thus, in light of the importance of the
Sherman Act's proscription against resale price maintenance 39 and group
boycotts, 4 ° the Court concluded that "the alleged illegal conduct of
35
 340 U.S. at 212-14.
" Id. at 214-15.
"Id. at 214.
38 See Trebuhs Realty Co., Inc. v. News Syndicate Co., Inc., 107 F. Supp. 595, 598-601
(S.D.N.Y. 1952) (applying Kiefer-Stewart to a claim for injunctive relief). Since Kiefer-Stewart was
decided in the context of a damage action, it is unclear whether the unclean hands defense
had been abolished in equity. One view suggests that an injunction should be denied where its
issuance might enhance a violating plaintiff's illegal position. See Comment, Antitrust Enforce-
ment by Private Parties: Analysis of Developments in the Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1010,
1029-30 (1952). The Trebuhs court, however, rejected this argument. Since the plaintiff in an
injuctive action ordinarily reaps no windfall benefit and since the plaintiff's action causes the
defendant's anticompetitive behavior to cease, the court herein deemed the defense to have
less merit in injunctive claims than where a plaintiff was seeking treble damages. 107 F. Supp.
at 600-01. See text at notes 116-29 infra.
Also unclear is whether Kiefer-Stewart fully abolished the "unclean hands" defense in the
situation where an antitrust plaintiff seeks to recover damages for injury to an intrinsically il-
legal business operation. See Maltz v. Sax, 134 F.2d 2, 3-5 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 772
(1943) (manufacture and sale of gambling devices not protected by Sherman Act). It can be
safely assumed that Congress did not intend the antitrust laws . to protect competition in pro-
scribed markets. Thus, to allow suit in such instances would not be necessary in order to ad-
vance the policy of the antitrust laws.
ag See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
46
 Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 242-43
(1948). See Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. Federal Trade Commission, 312 U.S. 457
(1941).
In Mandeville Island Farms, California sugar beet refiners, who constituted the only
available market for sugar beets grown in their locality, agreed among themselves that their
price to the growers with whom they ordinarily contracted to grow beets should be based on
the average net returns of all, rather than the separate return of each purchasing refiner. 334
U.S. 219, 222-26. As a consequence, a grower who contracted with the refiner having the
largest net return received less for his beets than he otherwise would have realized. Id. The
Supreme Court, in reversing the Ninth Circuit's dismissal of the action for absence of in-
terstate commerce jurisdiction, considered the defendant's allegation that the plantiff grower
actually benefited by the cartel's pricing scheme. Without referring to cases where the plaintiff
himself was involved in anticompetitive activity, the court suggested that the purpose of the
antitrust laws in promoting competition should not be diluted by barring suit on the basis of
plaintiff's incidental benefit from the complained of conduct.
[The] test of the legality and immunity of such a combination, in view of the
statute's policy, is not that some others than the members of the combination,
have profited by its operation. It is rather whether the statutes policy has been
violated in a manner to produce the general consequences it forbids for the pub-
lic and the special consequences for particular individuals essential to the re-
covery of treble damages.
Id. at 243.
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[Kiefer-Stewart] ... could not legalize the unlawful combination by
[Seagram & Sons] nor immunize them against liability to those then in-
jured."'" More generally, such unqualified language signalled an apparent
Court belief that the congressional opposition to restraints of trade was not
to be weakened by judicial dilution of the antitrust remedies.
In a second important case, Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 42 the Court gave
implicit recognition to the "coercion" exception to the in pari delicto de-
fense. Simpson involved a suit by an operator of a leased gasoline station
against his lessor-supplier. The operator initially had acquiesced in the
supplier's mandatory resale price terms." When the plaintiff subsequently
sold gasoline below the fixed price in order to meet competition, the de-
fendant oil company retaliated by refusing both to renew plaintiff's lease
and to supply him with further gasoline." The Court held that the de-
fendant's conduct constituted illegal resale price maintenance.'" In so hold-
ing, the Court did not expressly address the general propriety of the in
pari delicto defense; but by allowing the plaintiffs suit to lie, the Court in
effect ratified the "coercion" exception to the doctrine. Indicative of its ap-
proval of the "coercion" exception was the Court's description of the re-
lationship between the parties in Simpson as one where "dealers are coer-
cively laced into an arrangement under which their supplier is able to im-
pose non-competitive prices on thousands of persons whose prices other-
wise might be competitive."'" Thus, the Court concluded that any complic-
ity in the illegal pricing scheme that might be ascribed to the plaintiffs ini-
tial acquiescence was overshadowed by the disparate bargaining position be-
tween the parties."
Nevertheless, Simpson was not a clear articulation of the "coercion" ex-
ception. Consequently, it left unresolved the standard by which courts were
to determine whether plaintiff's had no economic alternative other than to
deal with defendants on the latters' illegal terms. 4 " Thus, Simpson, while
consistent with Kiefer-Stewart in advancing the Court's antipathy toward
fault defenses in private antitrust litigation, accomplished little in the way
of clarifying the general applicability of in pari delicto in antitrust suits.
In Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.," the Court fi-
nally confronted in pari delicto directly. In a majority opinion which ex-
pressed both a rejection of the idea that common law defenses are proper
in light of the statutory policy in favor of competition, and an affirmation
of the validity of the "coercion" exception to the in pari delicto defense, the
Court affirmed its rulings in Kiefer-Stewart and Simpson." However, more so
41 340 U.S. at 214.
" 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
"Id. at 14-15.
"Id. at 15.
' 5 1d. at 24.
45 1d, at 21.
" Id.
45 In several lower court cases prior to Simpson, alternatives available to the plaintiff had
been seen as insufficiently undesirable to allow the court to conclude that the plaintiff had
been compelled to deal with the defendant. See, e.g., Davidson v. Kansas City Star Co., 202 F.
Supp. 613, 620 (W.D. Mo. 1962); Allgair v. Glenmore Distilleries Co., Inc., 91 F. Supp. 93, 97
(S.D.N.Y. 1950).
4g
 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
5° See text at notes 54-66 infra.
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than in the preceding cases, the opinion in Perma Life produced marked di-
visions among members of the Court. Although seven members of the
Court concurred in the result of the case, only five justices joined in the
Court's opinion which stressed that the interest in promoting competition
should take precedence over any concern for the unjust enrichment of un-
worthy plaintiffs. A minority of the Court would have reversed this priority
of concerns." Moreover, even among members of the majority there was
no firm acceptance of a broad principle forever banishing in pari delicto
from private antitrust litigation. 52
The Perma 4e  plaintiffs were franchisees who operated "Midas Muf-
fler Shops" under franchise agreements with defendants, Midas Inc. and
International Parts Corp. The plaintiffs profited as franchisees and sought
to obtain additional franchises, but objected to terms of the franchise
agreement which barred the purchase of outside supplies, forbade sales
outside a designated area or of products other than those of the de-
fendants, and fixed resale prices. After the defendants refused to eliminate
these unlawful restrictions in the franchise agreement, the franchisees,
some of whom had cancelled their old agreements, initiated an action seek-
ing treble damages." In reversing the Seventh Circuit's judgment uphold-
ing application of in pari delicto, 54 the Court, 'in an opinion delivered by
Justice Black, initially observed the absence of a statutory justification for
the defense.55
 More significantly, the Court emphasized the "in-
appropriateness" of applying "common law barriers to relief" to private
suits endowed with public purposes." Citing Kiefer-Stewart and Simpson, the
Court flatly rejected the claim that unworthy antitrust plaintiffs should be
denied recovery:
The plaintiff who reaps the reward of treble damages may be no
less morally reprehensible than the defendant, but the law en-
courages his suit to further the overriding public policy in favor
of competition. A more fastidious regard for the relative moral
worth of the parties would only result in seriously undermining
the usefulness of the private action as a bulwark of antitrust en-
forcement. And permitting the plaintiff to recover a windfall
gain does not encourage continued violations by those in his po-
sition since they remain fully subject to civil and criminal
penalities for their own illegal conduct. 57
In light of this "overriding policy in favor of competition," the Court
held that the common law notion of in pari delicto was not to be rec-
ognized as a defense in antitrust suits." Yet, in later language the Court
51
 See text at note 67 infra.
5' See text at notes 68-74 infra.
53
 392 U.S. at 135, 137,
34
 376 F.2d 692, 699 (7th Cir. 1967). The court of appeals noted that each plaintiff had
enthusiastically sought its Midas franchise with knowledge of the restrictive provisions and that
plaintiffs had all made large profits and had sought additional dealerships. Under these cir-
cumstances, the court indicated, It would be difficult to visualize a case more appropriate for
in pari delicto." Id.
55 392 U.S. at 138.
55 Id.
53 Id. at 139 (citation omitted).
55 /d. at 140.
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effectively admitted that the case could have been decided without a hold-
ing which totally abolished the defense. The decision of the court of ap-
peals was reversible, the Court stated, because an in pari delicto defense
could not be maintained where a plaintiff only "[has] participated to the ex-
tent of utilizing illegal arrangements formulated and carried out by
others."" By this standard, the Perma Life plaintiffs escaped any legal
blame because "their participation was not voluntary in any meaningful
sense,"" since, in the Court's view, the plaintiffs accepted most of the re-
strictive requirements only as a necessary condition to obtaining an attrac-
tive business opportunity. 6 ' Thus, stated otherwise, the Court could have
decided in the plaintiffs' favor simply by applying the "coercion" exception
to the in pari delicto doctrine.
In addition to its evident misgivings concerning total abolition of the
defense, the Court limited the damages available to an in pari delicto plain-
tiff by indicating that whatever "beneficial byproducts" accrue to a plaintiff
from an anticompetitive conspiracy should be used to offset the plaintiff's
darnages. 62 This damage approach was viewed as a substitute for a general
inquiry that would scrutinize an illegal agreement in a clause-by-clause fash-
ion to determine which restraints operated to the plaintiff's advantage. 63
Consequently, despite the Perma Life Court's firm assertion that com-
mon Iaw defenses should play no role in private antitrust suits, the majority
opinion itself—by suggesting a damage-offset rule 94—proposed an inquiry
into the relative fault of the plaintiff. More importantly, the Court, in
summarily dismissing the defendants' claim that the franchisees actually
supported the illegal agreement from the start," expressly left open the
question of whether "truly complete involvement and participation in a
monopolistic scheme could ever be a basis, wholly apart from the idea of in
pari delicto, for barring a plaintiff's cause of action .... " 66
Nevertheless, the Court's opinion clearly established that the common
law defense of in pari delicto was not to operate—at least by that name—in
antitrust damage actions. The majority opinion, however, left for the de-
termination of the lower courts whether a plaintiff's complicity in an anti-
trust violation could ever be so egregious as to overcome the statutory pol-
icy favoring the bringing of suit.
A minority of the Court disagreed with this reasoning. For these Jus-
tices, subordination of the public interest favoring competition was war-
"Id. at 139.
"Id.
" Id. at 139-40. The Court observed that several of the clauses were disadvantageous to
the franchises and that they had consistently objected to them. Id.
62 1d. at 140,
as
	 id. at 148-53 (Marshall, J., concurring in the result). Under the approach rejected
by the Court, damages would be appropriate only for injuries resulting from clauses not in-
cluded for the plaintiff's benefit. See text at 150-152 infra.
84 392 U.S. at 140. See text at 149-51 infra.
" 392 U.S. at 140-41. The Court pointed to record evidence disclosing numerous in-
stances where franchisees sought to purchase goods from other sources of supply. A typical
response from the defendant-franchisor was that non-compliance with any terms of the
franchise agreement was "heresy" or, as one Midas official expressed it, "grounds for divorce."
Id. at 141.
" Id. at 140.
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ranted where to do otherwise would provide a windfall for a plaintiff im-
plicated in unlawful conduct. Unlike the majority view expressed by Justice
Black, the approach advocated by Justices Fortas, Marshall, Harlan, and
Stewart, as indicated in three separate opinions, embraced a balancing test
which, in varying degrees, weighted the interest in doing equity between
the parties more heavily than the interest in promoting competition."
Against this background stood the mediating opinion of Justice White.
While Justice White was nominally a member of the majority, having ex-
pressly joined in the opinion of the Court, his opinion reflected a substan-
tial compromise of principle from Justice Black's essentially firm position
eschewing common law barriers to antitrust enforcement.- For purposes of
divining the meaning of Perma Life, though, Justice White's opinion might
be the more important statement. Justice White's opinion, when coupled
with those of the four Justices in the minority, may be considered the fifth
of a majority willing to deny a plaintiff recovery where the plaintiff and de-
fendant are at equal fault, even though his opinion, taken together with the
views of Chief Justice Warren, Justices Black, Brennan and Douglas consti-
tuted a majority willing to abolish the doctrine by name.
Beginning from the same premise as did Justice Black, that the his-
toric concept of in pari delicto was a burden upon the efficient administra-
tion of the antitrust laws," Justice White stopped far short of suggesting
that the entire doctrine be abolished. In contrast to Justice Black, who had
declined to decide whether "complete participation" could constitute a de-
fense, Justice White openly supported barring recovery, "where plaintiff
and defendant bear substantially equal responsibility for injury resulting to
one of them."'" In reaching this conclusion, Justice White examined the de-
terrent effect of potential antitrust liability upon three hypothetical cases.
In one case, where a distributor sues a supplier for losses attributable to the
supplier's resale price maintenance program, Justice White stated that the
deterrent aims of the antitrust laws would be served by permitting suit,
since it would discourage holders of market power and leverage from coer-
cively engaging in illegal conduct. 7° Conversely, in a second case, where a
1'T Justice Harlan, for example, advocated retention of the defense on moral grounds
alone. The majority's purported abolition of the doctrine, he suggested cynically, amounted to
"sanctiontingl a kind of antitrust enforcement that rests upon a principle of well-compensated
dishonor among thieves," Id. at 154 (Harlan, J. dissenting in part). In contrast, Justice Mar-
shall, concurring in the result, indicated that any added deterrence to violations of the anti-
trust laws that would be engendered by the Court's holding was more than overshadowed by
the "new incentive" to commit such violations when potential conspirators can recover from
their associates any losses attributable to the scheme. Id. at 151 (Marshall, J., concurring in the
result).
88
 See text at notes 56-57 supra.
89
 392 U.S. at 146 (White, J., concurring). Relevant proof in this context Justice White
indicated, would consist of
facts as to the relative responsibility for originating, negotiating, and implement-
ing the scheme; evidence as to who might reasonably have been expected to ben-
efit from the provision or condikt making the scheme illegal ...; proof of
whether one party attempted to terminate the arrangement and encountered re-
sistance or counter-measures from the other; facts showing who ultimately prof-
ited or suffered from the arrangement.
Id. at 146-47.
"Id. at 145. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co, 273 U.S. 359
(1927).
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distributor sells less of a supplier's product because of a restriction imposed
by the supplier, Justice White found "no reason based on the deterrent
purposes of § 4 to permit [the supplier's] recovery."'" Likewise, in a third
case, where two competitors fix prices which, in turn, work to their mutual
detriment in the market, Justice White would deny recovery. To do other-
wise, he indicated, could be a "counter deterrent," which "by assuring
illegal profits if the agreement in restraint of trade succeeds, and treble
damages if' it fails ... may encourage what the Act was designed to pre-
vent."" On the basis of the reasoning in these hypothetical cases, Justice
White impliedly advanced the notion that. the degree of a plaintiffs re-
sponsibility in an antitrust conspiracy is an accurate measure of his market
power. As a corollary, he also seemed to suggest that the antitrust laws
were intended to deter chiefly, if not exclusively, the anti-competitive prac-
tices of those possessing leverage in the market." Thus, by finding a corre-
lation between the degree of fault—the minority's concern—and the de-
gree of' deterrence from potential antitrust liability—the chief consideration
of the majority—Justice White was able to bring together the division of
opinion on the Court."
What emerged from Perma Life, therefore, was a wounded—but
surviving—in pari delicto defense. If there were to be no in pall delicto de-
fense in antitrust suits after Perma Life, there apparently was to be a de-
fense based on Justice White's concurring opinion and those of the Perma
Life minority, which very much resembled the old "equal fault" doctrine."
Unlike the official majority in Perma Life, which had declined so to rule,
this reconstituted majority answered in the affirmative the question of
whether a "total and complete participation" defense could exist in-
dependently of the prior notions of in pall delicto.
II. IN PAKI DELICTO AF1FER PERMA LlFi
A. Damage Actions
The lower federal courts since Perma Life have engaged in an uneasy
search for the accurate interpretation of the Perma Life decision. While
courts appear to hold uniformly that a plaintiff will not be barred from
seeking treble damages where he is merely the incidental beneficiary of a
restrictive clause in an otherwise injurious scheme," Justice Black's implied
" 392 U.S. at 145 (White, J., concurring).
" Id. at 146.
" See text at notes 71-72 supra.
" In a fifth opinion Justice Fortas, concurring only in the result, adopted a position
most similar to that of Justice White. Unlike Justice White, however, Justice Fortas advocated a
standard that focused simply on the relative degree of fault of the parties, without any ref-
erence to the deterrent effect of disallowing the defense in any given case. See 392 U.S. at 147
(Fortas, J., concurring in the result).
" See Handler, Through the Antitrust Looking Glass, 57 CAI.. L. RE,v. 182, 201 (1969);
Millstein, Current Status of Affirmative Defenses, Including the Passing-On Defense, In Pare Delicto,
and Statutes of Limitations, 38 ANTrraus• L.J. III, 115 (1968).
"See, e.g„ Greene v. General Foods Corp., 517 F.2d. 635 (5th Cir. 1975); El Salto, S.A.
v. P.S.G. Co„ 444 F.2d 477 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971); Sahm v. V-1 Oil Co.,
402 F.2d 69 (10th Cir. 1968); Kane v. Martin Paint Stores, 1976-1 Trade Cas. 1 60,743
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1073 (D.N.J.
1973), affd, 521 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir. 1975).
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suggestion that an antitrust defense based on plaintiffs fault could exist
"wholly apart" from in pari delicto" has not provoked a consistent re-
sponse. A limited number of courts have read Justice Black's Perm Life
opinion to signal the end of the defense's viability in antitrust suits." The
overwhelming majority of courts that have ruled on in pari delicto since
Perm Life, however, have expressed a willingness to permit in pari delicto
defenses where the plaintiff has been shown, in Justice White's words, to
have borne "substantial equal responsibility" for the complained of illegal
activity." Notwithstanding this trend to allow some form of a revised in
pari delicto defense, courts are by no means uniform in the tests which
they have chosen to implement the principle. While the majority view re-
quires equal participation at the formation of an anticompetitive
conspiracy," some courts have adopted more flexible standards which de-
mand lesser amounts of culpability."
Only one court has expressly declared Perma Life to stand for the total
rejection of a "fault" defense in antitrust suits. In Morton v. National Dairy
Products Corp. 82
 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania bluntly stated that the in pari delicto defense "has been com-
pletely negatived by the Supreme Court in Perma Life ...." 83 A few other
courts have expressed doubt as to whether the defense is at all applicable.
For example, in Greene v. General Foods COI. 84 the Fifth Circuit .easily
dismissed a claim of in pari delicto because the court found a "great
disparity" between plaintiff and defendant in terms of antitrust culpability
and benefits conferred by the complained of scheme. 85 In reaching this re-
sult, the court "seriously question[ed]" whether in pari delicto was still via-
ble after Per= Life." However, for two reasons, Greene and cases employ-
ing similar language should not be read to preclude further application of
an in pari delicto defense by these courts. First, such language is often only
77 See text at note 65 supra.
7" Morton v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 287 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1968). See Greene
v. General Foods Corp., 517 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1975); Schokbeton Prd. Corp. v. Exposaic In-
dus., Inc., 308 F. Supp. 1366 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
" See, e.g., Javelin Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 546 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97
S. Ct. 2651 (1977); Dreibus v. Wilson, 529 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1975); Columbia Nitrogen Corp.
v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971); Premier Electrical Const. Co. v. Miller-Davis Co.,
422 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 400 U.S. 828 (1970); Midway Enterprises Inc. v. Pe-
troleum Marketing Corp., 375 F. Supp. 1339 (D. Md. 1974); Skouras Theatres Corp. v.
Radio-Keith-Orpheutn Corp., 58 F.R.D. 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
"° See, e.g., Premier Electrical Const. Co. v. Miller-Davis Co., 422 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 828 (1970); South-East Coal Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 434 F.2d 767
(6th Cir. 1970).
" See, e.g., Dreibus v. Wilson, 529 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1975); Skouras Theatres Corp. v.
Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp., 58 F.R.D. 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
82 287 F.Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1968). Morton involved certain charges of monopolization
and price discrimination by a Pennsylvania milk producer against a large national milk dis-
tributor. Id. at 754.
g3 /d. at 765. Since the defendants prevailed on the merits, this interpretation of Perma
Life was never appealed.
"517 F.2d 635, 646-47 (5th Cir. 1975).
"M. at 647.
"Id.
" See id.
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dicta." Second, since Perma Life should be read to bar suit by "complete
and total participation" plaintiffs, 88 behavior more egregious than that
found in cases such as Greene may constitute an in pari delicto barrier even
in these courts.
In contrast to those courts which have claimed or suggested that in
pari delicto is completely abolished, most courts' rulings on the defense
have been guided by Justice White's formulation of "substantial equal re-
sponsibility." 88 In perhaps the leading case since Perma Life, Premier Electri-
cal Construction Co. v. Miller-Davis Co.," the Seventh Circuit considered the
antitrust claim of a disappointed electrical subcontractor who alleged that a
general contractor and a competitor-subcontractor conspired to induce the
latter's competitors to submit artificially inflated bids for a large govern-
ment project to the general contractor's competitors." Reversing the
district court's summary invocation of in pari delicto against the plaintiff,
which had submitted such artificially inflated bids," the Seventh Circuit in-
terpreted Perma Life to hold "only that plaintiffs who do not bear equal re-
sponsibility for creating and establishing an illegal scheme, or who are re-
quired by economic pressures to accept such an agreement, should not be
barred from recovery simply because they are participants.' Conversely,
the court impliedly held that if the plaintiff bears equal responsibility for
creating the illegal scheme and has not been coerced by economic pressure
to accept such an agreement, participation in the scheme may be an
affirmative defense."
Tests similar to that adopted in Premier Electrical have been adopted in
the Fourth" and Sixth" Circuits. However, the Fourth Circuit's opinion in
Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co." needlessly clouds the rule the court
was seemingly attempting to set forth. In Columbia Nitrogen the court
examined an in pari delicto defense alleged in response to an antitrust
claim based upon reciprocal dealing practices." The court interpreted
88 See text at note 75 supra.
81' 392 U.S. at 146 (White, J., concurring). See text at notes 68-69 supra.
gO 422 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 828 (1970).
" Id. at 1134-35. The defendant in Premier Electrical was a general contractor who had
requested bids from several electrical subcontractors, including Premier, in preparation of his
bid on a project. Id. at 1134. The day before sealed bids were to be opened by the general
contractor, plaintiff and defendant allegedly agreed that Premier would get the tentative offer
if it would submit higher bids to the general contractor's competitors. Id. at 1135. Plaintiff
complied with the inflated bid scheme, but was denied the subcontract after the defendant was
awarded the general contract. Id. Thereupon, Premier brought suit alleging that the general
contractor and the electrical subcontractor which eventually got the job had conspired to in-
duce the subcontractor's competitors to submit artifically inflated bids to the general contrac-
tor's competitors. Id.
93
 292 F.Supp. 213, 218-19 (N.D. Ill. 1968). The district court, solely on the basis of
allegations in the pleadings, concluded that "Premier was an originating, moving, active and
aggressive party to the illegal bid-rigging scheme," Id, at 219.
63
 Premier Electrical, 422 F.2d at 1138.
"See General Beverage Sales Co.-Oshkosh v. East Side Winery, 396 F. Supp. 590, 593
(E.D. Wis. 1975),
95
 Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3, 15.16 (4th Cir. 1971).
"South-East Coal Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 434 F.2d 767, 784 (fith Cir. 1970).
"451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971).
98 Id. at 13. Royster executed a three-year contract for the sale of phosphate to Colum-
bia. Id. at 7. Prior to this contract, Royster had been a major purchaser of nitrogen from Co-
lumbia, but Columbia had never been a significant purchaser of any product from Royster. Id.
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Perma Life to "teach that when parties of substantially equal economic strength
mutually participate in the formulation and execution of the scheme and
bear equal responsibility for the consequent restraint of trade, each is
barred from seeking treble damages from the other."" While it appears
from the context of the opinion that the court was saying no more than did
the Premier Electrical court, the "equal economic strength" language used in
Columbia Nitrogen potentially is susceptible of misinterpretation. Read by it-
self the language suggests a prerequisite for invoking the defense based
principally on the nature of past dealings between the parties or on their
relative financial size. Despite the fact that subsequent language in the
opinion strongly indicates that the Fourth Circuit meant to adopt the Pre-
mier Electrical standard,'°° the use of this ambiguous expression may make
the in pari delicto test troublesome to apply in the Fourth Circuit.
A variation of the Premier Electrical approach, allowing the defense
only in more limited circumstances, recently has been adopted by the
Ninth Circuit. In Javelin Corp. v. Uniroyal Inc.,'" the court declared that an
in pari delicto defense in an antitrust suit lies only where the plaintiff is
shown to be indispensable in the creation of the complained of conspir-
acy.'"favelin involved suit by a wholesale tire distributor who sought treble
damages against a tire purchasing cartel, from which it had been expelled
for failure to fulfill its sales quota.' 03 The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants since Javelin was in pari delicto in the alleged
illegal territorial allocation and tying arrangement.'" In reversing this deci-
sion, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that the policy behind Perma Life man-
dated that only in "rare" circumstances should a plaintiff be denied re-
covery in a private antitrust suit on account of his own illicit participa-
tion.'" These circumstances, the court continued, were to be limited "to
where a plaintiff participated in the formation of the conspiracy."'" Fur-
thermore, the court in interpreting Justice White's concurring opinion, ex--
pressed a second qualification for the defense, holding it to bar only those
plaintiffs who but for their participation could have halted the conspiracy's
creation.'° 7
Shortly after the execution of the phosphate sales contract, however, the market price of
phosphate dropped substantially below the contracted price. Id. Columbia, thereupon, refused
to take further delivery, and Royster sued for contract damages. Id. at 13. Based upon past
reciprocal dealing practices, Columbia lodged an antitrust counterclaim. Id.
"Id. at 15.16 (emphasis added).
on see id. at 16.
' 1" 546 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2651 (1977).
Id. at 279.
103 Id. at 277-78. Founded in 1967, Javelin initially was capitalized poorly and thus
sought membership in a purchasing group in order to market an identifiable brand of tires.
After joining Tire Brands, Inc., and becoming a Uniroyal distributor, Javelin was assigned an
exclusive marketing area. Owing to its unique marketing procedure, Javelin showed unusual
profits and it soon marketed three brands of tires of its own. Decreasingly dependent on the
Uniroyal brand, Javelin was expelled from Tire Brands in 1972 for failure to maintain an ac-
ceptable level of quota sales. In 1973 Javelin brought suit alleging several antitrust violations,
including a horizontal conspiracy to allocate exclusive territories. Id.
"Id. at 278.
105 Id. at 279.
'NM. (emphasis added).
'"Id. at 279-80 n. 3. The Javelin court stated: "In adopting this standard, we agree
with Justice White, concurring in Perma Life, that the problem of who is entitled to recover is
one of degree of responsibility posing 'the issue of causation in particularized Form.' "Id.
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For the Javelin defense to operate, therefore, a plaintiff must have
been an indispensable party who was present at the formation of the illegal
scheme. Hence, the plaintiff in Javelin, which entered the cartel five years
after its creation, was not barred by its own fault from seeking antitrust re-
lief.'" Significantly, the court indicated that it would remain "a question of
fact for the jury" to determine if founding members of the conspiracy
would themselves be barred from suit on the basis of this additional "but
for" test.'" This statement represents an admission of the possibility of
permitting suit among founding conspiracy members where, because of
their numbers, responsibility becomes difficult to ascertain. It thus
dramatizes a limitation in Justice White's articulated approach. If the objec-
tive of his notion of in pari delicto is to bar suit where plaintiff's have en-
gaged in "truly complete participation in a monopolistic scheme," then to
allow suit by active joint conspirators only because none was indispensable
to the enterprise is an anomalous result. The implication of this outcome is
that "complete participants" in an antitrust conspiracy can immunize them-
selves from an in pari delicto defense by numerically fortifying their con-
spiracy.
Rather than move in the direction of greater restriction of the in pari
delicto defense, as did the Javelin court, several other courts have extended
Premier Electrical in the opposite direction by adopting standards authoriz-
ing use of the defense where plaintiffs' conduct is less than "equal partici-
pation at the conspiracy's creation." For example, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York has stated that to establish the
in pari delicto defense defendants need demonstrate only that "plaintiff's
participation in the conspiracy reached the same degree of involvement
and culpability as that of defendants and that plaintiff's, deliberately and of
their own volition, actively supported the illegal scheme for their own self-
interest." 110 Under this standard, which evidently finds maintaining an il-
legal conspiracy just. as odious as creating one, the Javelin plaintiff's would
have been barred from suit. Another liberal approach to the in pari delicto
defense was taken in Dreibus v. Wilson,'" where a different panel of Ninth
Circuit judges than that which decided Javelin approved a lower court's in-
terpretation of Perma Life stipulating that merely "a high degree of in-
volvement" in the illegal act could warrant invoking the defense." 2 Since
the Dreibus court failed to clarify what constitutes a sufficiently "high de-
gree of involvement," it is problematic just how little involvement might be
required before the defense would apply. 13
"" Id. at 280.
1 " Id. at 279-80.
m'Skouras Theatres Corp. v. Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp., 58 F.R.D. 357, 360
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
"' 529 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1970).
112 Id. at 174.
1'3 In addition, the district court in Dreibus appears to have erroneously applied its own
in pari delicto test, producing a result which might be read as a nullification of the rule which
permits co-conspirators to recover after withdrawing from the conspiracy. See Victor Talking
Mach. Co. v. Kemeny, 271 Fed. 810 (3d Cir. 1921) and text at notes 29-30 supra. Both plain-
tiff and defendant in Dreibus were 50 percent stockholders of a joint venture corporation
which had profited under an exclusive distributorship of Italian velvet for use in manufactur-
ing furniture. 529 F.2d at 171. Following a dispute between the parties, the plaintiff sued,
alleging that the defendant had caused the joint venture firm's exclusive contract to lapse for
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In sum, the Perma Life progeny in the federal courts have produced
several different standards to effectuate barring damage recovery for "total
and complete" in pari delicto plaintiffs in antitrust suits. However, it is
submitted that Justice White's "substantial equal fault" formulation is the
accurate representation of the Court's position on the doctrine,'" and, ac-
cordingly, Perma Life should be read to permit the defense only where it
can be shown that the plaintiff voluntarily participated in the illegal scheme
from the outset and was equally responsible for carrying out its objec-
tives." 5 In this regard, the Premier Electrical test, which applies to plaintiffs
that have played an equal part in the creation and functioning of a com-
plained of antitrust conspiracy, appears to be the most accurate reflection
of the narrow view of in pari delicto that evidently would have been
sanctioned by a majority of the Court. Moreover, in light of what seems the
correct reading of Pet-ma Life, the Javelin "but for" test, which would bar
from suit only indispensable conspirators, appears overly constrictive.
Likewise, the standard approved in Dreibus—a "high degree of
involvement"—is also undesirable as it might potentially be applied to deny
recovery to more plaintiffs than those contemplated by the Perma Life
Court.
B. Actions for Injunctive Relief
As is the case with courts of law, equity courts continue to disagree on
the availability of a fault defense in actions for injunctive relief under the
antitrust laws.' Since neither Keifer-Stewart nor Perma Life involved plain-
the purpose of recapturing the exclusive—and illegal—contract for itself. Id. at 171-72. Once
having re-established the distributorship, the defendant allegedly barred the joint venture
corporation from obtaining any further supply of Italian velvet. Id. On the basis of the plain-
tiffs involvement in the establishment of the original exclusive, and monopolistic,
distributorship, the district court held that the plaintiff was barred from recovering damages
for business losses occurring after the termination of its participation. Id. at 174.
The Dreibus decision may be explained in part by the form in which the suit was
brought. Since the plaintiff sued as a stockholder in the joint venture corporation seeking
damages for its lost profits, it clearly was vulnerable to the traditional in pari delicto defense
that operates where a plaintiff seeks to protect intrinsically illegal activity, see Maltz v. Sax, 134
F.2d 2, 5 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 772 (1943); see note 39 supra, in this case a monopoly
in the velvet market. Although the district court did not articulate expressly an "intrinsically
illegal activity" theory of the defense, it probably was mindful of the capacity in which the
plaintiff sued. Hoviever, at the time of suit the plaintiff was no longer a monopolist. Thus, in
ruling as it did, the court evidently ignored the well-established principle that allows a co-
conspirator to recover damages occurring after his withdrawal from the illegal activity. See Vic-
tor Talking Mach. Co. v. Kemeny, 271 Fed. 810 (3d Cir. 1921).
'" See text at note 75 supra. The concurring opinion of Justice White, when combined
with the views of the Perma Life minority, provides compelling authority for the existence of a
"complete participation" defense. Moreover, Justice White's opinion is the only authority that
speaks directly to the question left unanswered in the majority opinion in Perma Life. Justices
Fortas, Marshall, and Harlan's opinions provide less guidance, because these justices, unlike
Justice White, declined to join the Court's rejection of the common law version of antitrust in
pan delicto.
"5 See J.O. VON KALINOWSKI, 16N BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: Antitrust Laws and Trade
Regulation § 109.02 (1977 ed.).
" 6
 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970), provides that:
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for
and have injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having jurisdiction
over the parties, as against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the anti-
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tiffs seeking injunctive relief, courts have questioned the applicability of
these decisions to such actions. In Columbia Pictures Industries Inc. v. Ameri-
can Broadcasting Co., Inc., 17 independent film producers and distributors
sought a temporary injunction against ABC's exhibition of its own "made
for television" films, which were attacked as illegal "self-dealing" under the
antitrust laws." 8
 The Second Circuit denied the injunction, finding that the
movie companies' unrelated practice of "block booking" 11 ° constituted a
form of unclean hands. 12° The court expressly distinguished Perma Life,
reasoning that the public policy question involved in the issuance of tempo-
rary injunctions, even in antitrust cases, was whether the public interest
would be served by condemnation in advance of trial, not whether the
complained-of conduct restrained competition.' 2 ' In a sharp dissent, Judge
Lumbard argued that the allegation of block booking should carry "no
weight" against Perma Life's instructions regarding the "inappropriateness
of invoking broad common law barriers" to private relief that serves an im-
portant public purpose. 122 This case, the dissent suggested, should be de-
cided solely on the basis of the merits of plaintiffs' antitrust allegations.' 23
Judge Lumbard's concerns were similarly and more fully expressed by
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in Skil
Corp. v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Co.' 24 The Skil Corp. court found the
defense inapplicable in antitrust injunctive actions 128 because the strong
public interest in terminating anticompetitive conduct made "any incidental
benefit to the plaintiff' a "worthwhile price" to pay for antitrust enforce-
ment.'" By refusing to recognize the defense where only an injunction is
sought, the court indicated that the public would be protected from anti-
trust laws ... when and under the same conditions and principles as injunctive
relief against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is granted by
courts of equity, under the rules governing such proceedings, and upon the
execution of proper bond against damages for an injunction improvidently
granted and a showing that the danger of irreparable loss or damage is im-
mediate, a preliminary injunction may issue
" 7 501 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1974).	 •
"" Id. at 895-96. ABC's exhibition of its own films, it was alleged, eliminated the need
to buy outside films, thus depriving the movie producers of a principal market for feature
films. Plaintiffs also asserted a first amendment claim, arguing that the public interest de-
manded that "the widest possible dissemination from diverse and antagonistic sources" be
made available on television. Id. at 896.
" 9
 "Block booking" required ABC to license feature films in groups which included low
quality films as well as more desirable ones. Id. at 898-99.
121 Id. at 899. For other cases suggesting continued vitality of a "fault defense" in pri-
vate antitrust actions seeking equitable relief see Singer v. A. Hollander & Son, Inc., 202 F.24
55, 60 (3d Cir. 1953); Heldman v. United States Lawn Tennis Assoc., 354 F. Supp. 1241, 1249
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); Graham v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 825, 832 (F.D. Pa. 1964);
Louisiana Petroleum Retail Dealers, Inc. v. Texas Co., 148 F. Supp. 334, 337 (W.D. La. 1956).
"2
 501 F.2d at 901-02 (Lumbard, J., dissenting).
"3 ld.
121
 351 F. Stipp. 65 (N.D. III. 1972). The Skil Corp. court was asked to enjoin the de-
fendant's alleged price discrimination, tying, and other anticompetitive conduct. The de-
fendant, in turn, challenged this motion by contending that the plaintiff had sought to involve
it in a conspiracy to fix prices. Id. at 66.
its Id .
1 " Id.
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competitive conduct with no danger, as arguably present in damage ac-
tions, 127 that businessmen would be encouraged to enter anticompetitive
conspiracies." 9
It is submitted that the Skil Corp. holding is the sounder approach to
apply in antitrust injunctive actions. Such an approach satisfies both of the
concerns expressed in the Perina Life opinions—discouraging anti-
competitve conduct and preventing unjust enrichment. A conspirator's
knowledge that he later may be able to enjoin the illegal conspiracy in
which he participates, where he otherwise would be barred by a fault de-
fense, would probably play no part in a potential conspirator's decision to
collude. Further, by disclosing the conspiracy he risks his own exposure
and liability without the offset of treble damages. Thus, the abolition of a
fault defense in antitrust actions for injunctive relief facilitates enforcement
of the antitrust laws without the possible deleterious side-effect of provid-
ing "compensated dishonor among thieves." 129
With respect to both damage and injunctive actions under the anti-
trust laws, the trend is to recognize in pari delicto defenses only in limited
circumstances. By paying special attention to Justice White's concurring
opinion in Perna Life, courts have attempted to accommodate the two
policies of providing effective antitrust enforcement and of avoiding judi-
cial sanctioning of unjust enrichment. This attempted accommodation,
however, has weakened the deterrent force of the antitrust laws. It has
produced a variety of "equal fault" standards which variously require ex-
tensive adjudication, yield inequitable results, or are vague in application.
The net result of this development, it is submitted, is the discouragement
of private suit due to the unnecessary injection of complication and un-
certainty into antitrust litigation.
III. A PROPOSAL: GENERAL ABOLITION OF IN PART DELICTO FROM
PRIVATE ANTITRUST SUITS
Given the confusion surrounding the present status of the in pari de-
licto defense, now is the time for Congress or the Supreme Court to re-
consider its availability in private antitrust actions.'" If the purpose of sec-
tion 4 of the Clayton Act' 3 '—promoting competition—is to be honored, in
pari delicto should be abolished completely from all private antitrust ac-
tions except those where the public interest in discouraging anticompetitive
behavior is absent. Such an abolition would have a number of salutary ef-
fects. Most importantly, removal of in pari delicto from the corpus of anti-
' 27
 See text at note 71 supra, and notes 36-37 infra.
12" 351 F. Supp. at 66. See Comment, Unclean Hands —The Effect of Plaintiff's Antitrust Vio-
lations in Antitrust Actions, 113 U. PA. L. Ray. 1071, 1086-89 (1965); see also Magna Pictures
Corp. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 265 F. Supp. 144, 149 (C.D. Cal. 1967); Hawaiian Tuna
Packers, Ltd. v. International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, 72 F. Supp. 562,
567 (D. Hawaii 1947).
1 " See Perma Life, 392 U.S. at 154'(Harlan, J., dissenting in part).
1 " Reconsideration of in part delicto under the antitrust laws seemingly would be within
the scope of the Presidential Commission on the Antitrust Laws, which will sit during 1978.
Among the Commission's major tasks will be to review existing antitrust immunities and
exemptions, as well as to consider means to expedite lengthy antitrust cases. N.Y. Times, Oct.
13, 1977, § D, at 3, col. 1.
13 ' See text at notes 1-5 supra.
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trust. law would increase the cost of anticompetitive conduct and thereby
reduce the willingness of any firm or person to participate in an antitrust
violation. in addition, this reform would eliminate the diverse tests now
being applied to implement the defense, preclude forum shopping, and
end the current uncertainty with respect to damages in cases where in pari
delicto is rejected.
The guidelines enunciated in Justice White's concurring opinion' 32
presently bar lower federal courts from adopting a more sweeping rejection
of in pari clelicto than that set forth by the Perma Life court. In attempting
to harmonize deterrence considerations with those relating to the equities
between the parties,'" however, Justice White grounded his arguments on
a questionable economic base. Although chiefly concerned with avoiding
unjust enrichment problems, Justice White premised permissible invocation
of' in pari delicto on his economic belief that in certain kinds of cases the
possibility of suit would either fail to deter or, in fact, encourage anti-
competitive behavior.
Justice White argued that where a small distributor accedes to a tnan-
ufacturer's poorly conceived price fixing agreement, with the result of re-
ducing the latter's sales, suit by the manufacturer against the cooperating
distributor should be barred.'" He characterized this kind of arrangement
as one where "[the distributor] was unwilling to enter the illegal scheme,
was motivated principally by what he thought was economic necessity—the
need to avoid losing business by being unable to offer a major product
line—and would have been only marginally deterred by the prospect of'
antitrust liability."'" To the contrary, however, such a small businessman
would be most vulnerable to the threat of paying treble damages. Since he
can least afford the expense of such a judgment, the mere possibility of re-
covery against him should chill his acquiescence in any illegal scheme.'"
Moreover, by creating such a deterrent, small businessmen generally would
abstain from engaging in such illegal conduct, thereby substantially
eliminating the ability of a large supplier or manufacturer to sponsor anti-
trust violations.
Justice White would also permit the invocation of in pari delicto to
bar suit between the parties where two competitors engage in an illegal
conspiracy, to the detriment of one but not of the other. In this situation,
he contended, permitting recovery could encourage unlawful combinations
"by assuring ... illegal profits if the agreement in restraint of trade suc-
ceeds, and treble damages if it fails ...."'" From an economic perspective,
however, this proposition is questionable. Although it may be argued that
the possibility of such reward discourages businessmen from seeking sub-
stitutes or finding ways of avoiding damages,'" the more plausible view is
132 See text at notes 68-74 supra.
133 1d.
134 392 U.S. at 145 (White, J., concurring).
135 1d. at 145-146.
' 3" See text at notes 139-41 infra.
I" 392 U.S. at 146 (White, J., concurring).
' 3 " See Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust Enforcement and Economic Efficiency: The Uneasy Case for
Treble Damages, 17 J.L. & ECON. 329, 335 (1974); Comment, Unclean Hands—The Effect of Plain-
tiffs Antitrust Violations in Antitrust Actions;. 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1071, 1082 (1965). Several courts
have denied damages where to allow their award was believed to act as an incentive to incur
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that the abolition of in pari delicto in such cases makes cartel formation
riskier and, thus, less likely to occur.'"
As rational profit maximizers, potential conspirators figure into the
cost of their conduct the probability of successful antitrust enforcement and
consequent damages."° When those closest to the conspiracy are not
barred from recovery, the probability of getting caught, and hence the cost
of engaging in anticompetitive conduct, is necessarily increased."' Com-
pounding the risk of unlawful collusion is the fact that once disclosed in
court, a defendant's action may render him liable, to further civil action or
possible government prosecution. Moreover, the recent parens patriae
amendment to the antitrust laws, 142 allowing state attorneys general to
bring actions on behalf of the consumers in their states, reinforces the de-
terrent effect of antitrust disclosure by increasing the likelihood of suit. 143
To an extent, abolition of in pari delicto also can be squared with the
minority view in Perma Life that desired courts to avoid becoming parties to
the distribution of "compensated dishonor among thieves." 144 It should be
remembered that even in the most egregious cases of "complete involve-
ment," indeed especially so, the plaintiff who is implicated in illegal activity
risks losing whatever recovery he may obtain in court by the possibility of
later suit by consumers or by government prosecution. Since the govern-
ment does not shoulder the financial burden for private enforcement, and
them. Ste, e.g., American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., 191 F.2d 38, 55 (8th Cir. 1951);
Sun Cosmetic Shoppe v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 178 F.2d 150, 153 (2d Cir. 1949) (L.
Hand., j.).
In See It POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 	 § 25.2; at 360 (1973); Becker. Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Poi.. ECON. 169 (1968).
Unfortunately, it is doubtful whether policymakers will ever have access to empirical
data which will indicate condusively if the availability of the in pari delicto defense actually
encourages or discourages participation in anticompetitive conspiracies. Deterrence studies are
difficult, if not impossible, to perform with scientific accuracy. See Wheeler, Antitrust Treble
Damage Actions–Do They Work?, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1319, 1320 (1973).
10 See Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pm. ECON. 169 (1969).
'" See Loevinger, Private Action–the Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 ANTITRUST BULL. 167,
167 (1959).
Voluntary compliance as a matter of conscience must always be regarded as the
broadest base for the effectiveness of any law. However, in the field of competi-
tive business—which is the area of concern for antitrust—the conscientious busi-
nessman who desires to observe the law may be forced by competition of the less
scrupulous to disregard it unless there is effective and reasonably certain en-
forcement.
with
 this, as well as for other reasons, the degree of voluntary com-
pliance ith a law depends to a large extent on expectation of vigorous and cer-
tain enforcement action.
'" 15 U.S.C.A. §15C (Stipp. 1977).
113
 A problem beyond the scope of this comment is the unfortunate fact that disclosure
of the basis of antitrust settlements is too often withheld from public view. Since consumers
bear the brunt of anticompetitive conduct through the payment of higher prices, the antitrust
laws should be more cognizant of the public's inability to pierce the veil of corporate com-
merce to see questionable business practices. See Comment, Wrongs Without Remedy: The Concept
of Parens Patriae Suits for Treble Damages under the Antitrust Laws, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 570 (1970).
A suggested approach might be to require public disclosure of settled antitrust cases. Since a
subsequent consumer damage award could be staggering, the antitrust laws' deterrent effect
would be additionally increased. See also Blair, The Sherman Act and the Incentive to Collude, 17
ANTITRUST BULL. 433, 435 (1972); Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. EcoN.44 (1965).
141 See Note, Rethinking In Pari Delicto: An Antitrust Policy Analysis, 3 FLA. ST. L. REV. 360,
374 (1975).
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the co-conspirators pay the damages, the public is a third-party beneficiary
of the suit through the deterrent effect it creates. This fact should discount
substantially any moral hostility felt by the court in awarding damages to an
antitrust offender. Moreover, since public policy is the basis for the judicial
animus towards unjust enrichment, it is not inconsistent for the in pari de-
licto defense to be abolished, as the defense's abrogation serves to imple-
ment the predominant statutory policy of promoting competition. In other
areas of the law the defenses of in pari delicto and unclean hands have
abated where'a greater public good would be promoted.'"
In addition to enhancing the deterrent power of the antitrust laws by
making cartel formation potentially costlier,'" abolition of in pail delicto
would have the beneficial effects of standardizing the diverse tests presently
being applied and of relieving uncertainty with respect to damages in cases
where in pari delicto is rejected. In light of Justice Black's perfunctory
treatment of the evidentiary requirements for proving a coercive bargain-
ing situation"' and his failure to describe more specifically what constitutes
complete participation in a monopolistic scheme, 14 " it is not surprising that
the courts interpret Perma Life with substantial variation. But the un-
certainty surrounding these terms clouds the deterrent effect of the law by
providing potential avenues of escape for antitrust defendants. To this ex-
tent, the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct is probably increased by re-
tention of the defense.
Furthermore, due to these uncertain standards and their variation
from court to court, it is probable that antitrust litigation is needlessly pro-
longed and that antitrust plaintiffs and defendants shop for the most fa-
vorable forum. Both of these effects undercut the deterrent force of the
antitrust laws and burden the judicial system. By adopting a single uniform
national standard—abolishing the defense except in certain easily-
identifiable situations—the policy of the antitrust laws, promoting competi-
tion, which formed the primary concern of even the Perma Life court, 14"
would best be advanced.
In addition, abolition of' in pari delicto would enable Congress or the
Court to end any uncertainty attending the proper measure of' damages in
cases where in pari delicto is raised but not sustained. In Perma Life, Justice
Black noted that "the possible beneficial byproducts of a restriction from a
plaintiffs point of view" could be considered in computing damages where
the plaintiff was not barred from suit.' 5 ° Interpretations of this language,
however, may result in discouraging suit, since it is not clear whether this
standard was meant to imply that gains from one restrictive provision can
offset losses attributable to another, that damages are to be weighed against
'5 See Comment, Limiting the Unclean Hands and In Pari Delicto Defenses in Antitrust Suits:
An Additional Justification, 54 Nw. U. L. Rev. 456, 462-64 (1959).
'" See text at notes 139-41 supra.
"T justice Black gave no hint whether the existence of even one restrictive provision
which did not favor the plaintiff, such as a restriction on dealing in the goods of a competitor,
could provide the basis for a conclusion of coercion. See 392 U.S. at 140-41.
"" id. at 140. See text at notes 150-52 infra.
19 392 U.S. at 139. See text at notes 56-57 supra.
I" 392 U.S. at 140 (1968). See Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 514 F.2d 690,
695 (5th Cir. 1975).
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a comparison of profits with and without the illegal scheme,' 5 ' or simply
that there are no damages available where there is no injury shown. 152 If
either of the first two interpretations is followed, the Supreme Court's at-
tempt to avoid awarding a windfall may result in deterring suit, and
thereby, in preventing public disclosure of the entire anticompetitive
scheme. By unequivocally adopting the third interpretation, that there are
no damages available where no injury is shown, the purposes of the anti-
trust laws would be served best, because a plaintiff would not be
discouraged from suit by the possibility that his recovery would be reduced
by the amount of his gains under the anticompetitive scheme.
Any abolition of in pad delicto, however, should be qualified by two
exceptions. First, where a plaintiff seeks to protect his own illegal activ-
ity,' 55 in pad delicto should remain viable. The antitrust laws are not con-
cerned with promoting competition where the ultimate economic transac-
tions are unlawful.' 54 Secondly, an in pad delicto plaintiff should not be
allowed to bring suit against an antitrust defendant on the basis of a final
judgment or decree rendered in a civil or criminal proceeding brought by
the United States. 155 To allow such recoveries would serve no additional
disclosure function, while at the same time the recoveries could reduce the
resources available for distribution to worthier plantiffs.
CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court in its 1968 Perna Life decision pur-
ported to abolish the defense of in pad delicto in private antitrust actions,
few courts have suggested that the defense has no vitality whatsoever. Most
courts have indicated a willingness to bar antitrust recovery at least to
plaintiffs who are shown to have been "truly complete participants" in an
anticompetitive conspiracy.
No court, however, has been able to advance a satisfactory rationale
for denying recovery to such plaintiffs, when such results almost certainly
derogate from the policy of promoting competition. It is submitted that the
rule that would best implement the antitrust policy of discouraging anti-
' S1 See Note, 82 Hmtv, L. REv, 260, 265-66 (1968).
152 See Perma Life, 392 U.S. at 152 (Marshall, J., concurring in the result). For a discus-
sion of the existence of "no damage" antitrust violations see generally Areeda, Antitrust Viola-
tions Without Damage Recoveries, 89 HAM'. L. REV. 1127, 1138-39 (1976).
's' See Maltz v. Sax, 134 F.2d 2 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 772 (1943). See note 39
supra.
'" It is not contemplated, of corse, that an antitrust plaintiff would be barred on the
basis of unrelated evidence indicating non-compliance with state licensing or regulatory law.
See, e.g., Semke v. Enid Automobile Dealers Ass'n, 456 F,2d 1361 (10th Cir. 1972); Health
Corp. of. America, Inc. v. New Jersey Dental Ass'n, 1977-1 Trade Cas. 11 61,232 (D.N.J.
1977). Only where the economic activity is intrinsically illegal would the plaintiff be barred
from anti-trust suit.
"'Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1970), provides that such a judg-
shall be prima facie evidence ag8inst such defendant in any action or proceeding
brought by any other party against such defendant under said laws or by the
United States under Section 15(a) ... as to all matters respecting which said
judgment ordecree would be an estoppel as between the parties thereto....
merit
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competitive conspiracies would be the abolition of in pari delicto in all cases
except those in which the plaintiff seeks to protect his own illegal activity or
where he attempts to reap the benefit of a prior government antitrust
judgment. Such an approach would have the beneficial effect of increasing
the probability that an antitrust violator will become subject to antitrust
penalties. Concomitantly, this added deterrence factor should discourage
the formation of illegal cartels and conspiracies, thereby ensuring that
fewer antitrust violations occur.'"
GORDON P. KArrz
16 Tire in pari delicto defense also has been the subject of controversy under federal
securities laws. While some courts have adopted the defense, see, e.g., Kuehnert v. Texstar
Corp., 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969); Lantz v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 418 F. Supp. 653
(D. Alas. 1976), at least one commentator has attacked this development as undercutting the
objectives of the securities laws. See Comment, In Pan Deficit, as a Bar to Tippee's Recovery Under
Rule 10b-5: The Concept of "Public Interest" in Trade Regulation Compared, 1 I B.C. IND. & Com. L.
RE:v.257 (1970).
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